Violence... The story so far

Updated 10 July 2008

In one result, the surge could well catalyze a cataclysm in the end.

Another possibility is that it could maintain enough order over enough time for the three warring factions to complete a de-facto segregation as a precursor to three new nations, providing interested neighboring states lay off.

In yet another result, the Iraqi people could realize their own future by becoming assertive in finding their own solutions. This third possibility now seems a bit more likely. However, this result came about much more from Iraqis taking control and opposing al Qa'ida than it did from The Surge.

Creativity and flexibility in both our diplomacy and conduct are still needed on our part. As a nation, let's be in the vanguard of a new wave of thinking; let's stop reacting to hysteria and start acting thoughtfully with the lessons of history fully in mind. Additional options are possible in Iraq; we just need to recognize them in our diplomacy.

Let's pause here for some updating.

Small Wars Journal
• Iraq has turned into a strange insurgency, but the same rules apply: the occupied learn to hate the occupiers. In the Iraqi case, al Qa'ida behaved as an occupier; walking in through a door opened by the U.S. invasion. Al Qa'ida began going after certain tribes, who finally realized they had a second enemy, one they could do something about. And they did. Only after that event, did terrorism begin damping down in Iraq. The tribes may quarrel among themselves, but when attacked they can and do band together and act in concert. AQI, al Qa'ida in Irag, was seen as foreign, so they took the hit, too. AQI is not dead yet in Iraq, but their operations have become more difficult.
  
  WonkRoom -- ThinkProgressl
• Threat of withdrawal scared many Iraqis and the Iraqi government into action. This was likely a lesser issue than the above. But it is a credible explanation, for the area under government control at least.
  
  BBC News
• Sadr froze militia activities for six months in order to reorganize it. While this move implies significant problems of control, the temporary result is a decrease in violence.

Add these to the features affecting violence, and it appears that The Surge can at most be a minor and ancillary matter affecting violence in Iraq. A resurgence in terror attacks is likely as al Qa'ida regroups.

Americans being what we are, will find it all too easy to believe The Surge is working, or if it stops working, it will be someone else's fault. The media, along with the administration, prefers one liners. The total situation, is after all, complex, and complex makes for bored audiences and bored audiences do not sponsors make. The media is safe as long as it waves the catchy-phrases and leaves it at that. And we, as a people, buy into it.


Are the Sunni, Kurd and Shia generals--all speaking in harmony? [Not to mention local tribes, politicians, theologians and neighboring states.] Are all three factions cooperating fully with a greater Iraq in mind? History over more than a millennium says that the Kurds and Sunnis are quite unlikely to both acquiesce to Shia control--short of a Shia-Hussein-style dictatorship. Whether the ultimate government is democratic, Islamic, or something in between, the Shia will by their sheer numbers dominate. There is no Gandhi, no Nelson Mandela in Iraq, nor could there be in such a splintered society that is Iraq. Ethnic cleansing is the order of the day. Any ultimate government might be possible only after a protracted civil war that would involve neighboring states.

The Carnegie Endowment for Peace is in the business of studying peace. They have a few things to say:

“The United States government is suffering from a curious learning disability when it comes to Iraq. As it begins the painful process of disengaging from Iraq, the U.S. is at risk of repeating the mistakes it made going into the war.

This is particularly curious because such a strong consensus has developed about the mistakes made going in. Liberals and conservatives, Republicans and Democrats, defenders and critics of the decision to go to war have all settled on the same list of errors: Not sending enough troops; not anticipating correctly the training and armor that the troops would need; dismantling the Iraqi army; failing to prevent the looting; purging Baath Party members from government jobs, thus leaving thousands of Iraqi families without income and important agencies bereft of critical personnel; misreading the nature of the enemy; underestimating the Sunni-Shiite conflict; misjudging the influence of Iran, Syria and foreign jihadists; squandering reconstruction funds and the catastrophic attempt to micromanage Iraq right after the invasion.

"Obviously the United States can't recommit all of those specific mistakes, but amazingly, the assumptions that led to them are still intact, and still inform the proposals and debates about what should be the next steps in Iraq. Consider:"

We could not agree more. We can set and achieve military objectives without addressing any of the underlying sectarian differences that cause the violence, not to mention the reality of economic imperialists trying to corner Iraqi oil reserves.

Many observers now, including low- and high-level military veterans, see as we do, that more of the same in Iraq can only make things worse, not better, for all parties. A multi-way civil war is in progress, enabled by our presence. How is a surge helping that? It has quieted parts of Baghdad at the price of enclosures and check points, an Iron Wall in other words. The surge has reportedly made areas remote from Baghdad more violent.

See also:

• The Nation
• Washington Post
• Anti-War.com
• Space War
• Appealforredress.org
• Truthdig.com.
• Blackwhite Modern Thought Control

Rules of engagement are great. But we violated many from the get-go in Iraq. Rules are workable only if they include, first and foremost, making friends instead of enemies.

There is far more at stake here than American interests--an apt phrase for modern empire. There is far more at stake than the Iraqi people. What is also at stake are the people in the mirrors we see each day!

Making a mistake may be no crime, but if we fail to learn from it, we hurt ourselves most of all.

Polarizing, sociopathic leadership went unrecognized too long. Can any safeguards to prevent a repeat be found? Probably not as long as special interests control Congress. Can broad education in history, political science, sociology, anthropology with emphasis on the scientific method help? Anything to be learned from the Japanese Model? Are we so smug and arrogant that anything not invented here, NIH, is not worthy of our time? Are we so wrapped up in the "good life" that we fail to see or believe that our present course, if continued too long, spells decline? Could we wake up one fine day and find Europe, India, and China calling the tunes for us? That is what happened to Rome, but it can't happen here; or can it? We think Dialogue is the best way, perhaps only way, forward to a world democracy comprised of democracies that have made peace with both their local and international market economies with effective separation of church and state.

Comments invited.